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FOLD OR FIGHT: THE CHANGING
SETTLEMENT CALCULUS IN CERCLA
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Lemuel M. Srolovic and Pamela R. Esterman*

"I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 2 also known as
Superfund, is approaching its third decade. Over the past twenty
years, there have been marked changes in the scope of liability
under CERCLA as defined by the federal courts.
In the 1980's and the early 1990's, the federal courts seemingly
rejected all arguments against broad liability in government enforcement and cost recovery actions under CERCLA. The courts
invoked the remedial goals of the Act in broad decisions expanding the reach of the statute.' At the same time, the courts
accorded a potentially responsible party ("PRP") targeted by the
government with ample means to distribute the costs of hazardous substance remediation to other PRPs. 4 This dynamic promoted settlements in government enforcement actions. The inevitable handful of PRPs selected by the government to remediate

* Mr. Srolovic and Ms. Esterman are partners at the law firm of
Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. in New York City.
1. Ulysses S. Grant, Dispatch to Washington from Spottsylvania
Courthouse (May 11, 1864), reprinted in J. BARTLETr, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONs 501 (16th ed. 1992).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas, 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1263
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (rejecting third-party defense), rev'd, 2 F.3d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (rejecting "act of God" and third-party defenses). The remedial
goals embodied in CERCLA are discussed in Section II, infta.
4. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 478-79
(S.D.N.Y 1990) (arguing that regardless of a PRP's degree of responsibility, that party is still entitled to bring a CERC[A action against other
PRPs to seek contribution).
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a site or reimburse the government's cleanup costs had powerful
incentives to invest their resources in spreading the costs to
other PRPs rather than fighting a losing battle against the
government.
As CERCLA enters its third decade, new trends are emerging
that could significantly alter this dynamic. On the one hand,
courts are curtailing the expansive reach of CERCLA liability and
breathing new life into its limited defenses.5 This trend offers a
PRP, who is targeted by the government, new weapons with
which to defend itself. On the other hand, some courts are more
frequently placing obstacles in the way of PRPs trying to shift
costs to other PRPs on an equitable basis. 6 For the PRP selected
by government enforcers to clean up a contaminated site or to
reimburse the government's expenditures under joint and several
liability, these dual trends provide new incentives to fight the
government as opposed to settling and shouldering the burden
of allocating costs more broadly.
To foster settlements and voluntary cleanups with private monies, the courts should continue to exercise their considerable
power under CERCLA's contribution provision7 and fashion rules
which promote the equitable distribution of CERCLA liability.
Such an approach is consistent with curtailing the expansive
reach of CERCLA and protects those parties identified by the
government from bearing responsibility for contamination by
others.
II.

CERCLA's BROAD REMEDIAL PURPOSE

The overriding purpose of CERCLA is to protect human
health and the environment from the dangers posed by hazard-

5. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc. ("ABB"), 120 F.3d 351, 358-59 (2d
Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir.
1996); New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996).
6. See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc. ("Acushnet II"), 948 F.
Supp. 128 (D. Mass. 1996); Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc. ("Acushnet
I"), 937 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1996); Kalamazoo River Study Group v.
Rockwell Int'l, 3 F Supp. 2d 799 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994).
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ous substances.' The two principal goals of the statute are to:
(1) clean up hazardous waste sites promptly and effectively; and
(2) ensure that those responsible for the problem "bear the
costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
they created."9
Because CERCLA is a remedial statute, courts have often cited
the remedial purpose canon to support expansive interpretations
of the statute. 10 The elements of CERCLA liability, the scope and
nature of liability, as well as the costs that may be recovered
upon a determination of liability have all been broadly con2
strued."' Conversely, defenses have been narrowly construed.1

III.

NEW WEAPONS TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT

During CERCLA's first fifteen years, the courts deciding
Superfund cases rewrote traditional rules of liability to further
CERCLA's broad remedial purposes. 3 More recent appellate decisions, however, have limited the seemingly boundless expansion

8. S.REP. No. 96-848, at 51-63 (1980) (stating that paramount purpose for response authority provided by S. 1480 is protection of health,
welfare, and environment).
9. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982). Under the statutory paradigm, "Superfund" permits the government to respond quickly to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances, and then the public fund is replenished
through cost recovery from responsible parties. See Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
10. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1503
(6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the "all costs incurred" language of CERCLA, together with the statute's broad remedial purpose, support a liberal interpretation of recoverable costs), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057
(1990).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 203 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (CERCLA defenses are narrow).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990) (ruling that a lender could be liable without being an
operator by participating in the financial management of a facility),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.,
681 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that CERCLA, because of its broad remedial purpose, superseded state corporate law in
determining the capacity of a dissolved corporation to be sued).
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of CERCLA. This trend may be seen in the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Bestfoods ("Bestfoods")," 4 the
Court's first decision addressing the reach of CERCLA's liability
provision, Section 107.1 5 The trend may also be seen in recent
decisions curtailing liability from the passive migration of contaminants.1 6 Decisions breathing life into CERCLA's third-party
defense 7 are further examples of the recent judicial trend narrowing the scope of CERCLA liability. 8
A.

Bestfoods & Corporate Parent Liability

In 1991, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan held that a corporate parent could be liable under
CERCLA for contamination at a site owned and operated by a
subsidiary.'9 Relying in part on the remedial nature of the statute, the District Court ruled that if a corporate parent "exerted
power or influence over its subsidiary by actively participating in
and exercising control over the subsidiary's business during a period of disposal of hazardous waste," then the parent was directly
liable under CERCLA.20 After a lengthy journey through the
Sixth Circuit, 2' the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the is22
sue of corporate parent liability under CERCLA.
In Bestfoods, 23 the Supreme Court held that a parent corpora-

14. 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (holding that when the corporate veil is
pierced, a parent corporation may be charged with derivative CERCLA
liability for its subsidiary's actions in operating a polluting facility).
15. See infta Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(1994).
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549
(W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
51 (1998).
20. CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F.Supp. at 573.
21. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Michigan, 59 F.3d 584
(6th Cir.), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Michigan, 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.
1997), en banc, (The Sixth Circuit's en banc decision ratified a prior ruling by two of three judges on the original appeal panel).
22. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
23. Id.
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tion that actively participates in and exercises control over the
operations of a subsidiary generally may not be held liable as an
operator of a contaminated site owned or operated by the subsidiary. The parent corporation will be held liable, however, if
the corporate veil is pierced under state law. 24 The Supreme
Court found that CERCLA does not authorize departure from
traditional principles of limited liability for a corporate parent:
It is a general principle of corporate law deeply "ingrained in
our economic and legal systems" that a parent corporation (socalled because of control through ownership of another corporation's stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. Although this respect for corporate distinctions when the subsidiary is a polluter has been severely criticized in the literature
nothing in CERCIA purports to reject this bedrock principle,
and against this venerable common-law backdrop, the congres25
sional silence is audible.
In Bestfoods, the Court recognized that a parent corporation
may be directly liable for its own acts where those acts satisfy the
elements for operator liability under CERCLA.2 6 The Supreme
Court, however, refused to sanction an expansive interpretation
of the statute which would place (i) direct CERCLA liability on a
parent in circumstances where the parent is not an "operator"
based on its own actions or (ii) vicarious liability in circumstances where the corporate veil could not be pierced under
traditional veil-piercing standards. 2 The Court found no basis to
presume that Congress intended to abrogate common law principles shielding shareholders:
Nothing in CERCLA purports to rewrite this well-settled rule
[of veil-piercing] .... CERCLA is thus like any another congressional enactment in giving no indication "that the entire
corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because
a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal statute,"
and the failure of the statute to speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands
application of the rule that "[i]n order to abrogate a common-

24.
25.
Shanks,
LJ. 193
26.
27.

Id. at 1885.
Id. at 1884-85 (quoting William 0. Douglas and Carrol M.
Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE
(1929)) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1886.
Id. at 1885-87.
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law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question
addressed by the common law."2"
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that Congress intended to establish some CERCLA-specific liability rule for corporations that would outrank traditional common law doctrine. For
example, the Court refused to cast off the presumption that officers employed by both a parent and a subsidiary are serving the
subsidiary when they act on behalf of the subsidiary.2 9 The Court
explained: "There would in essence be a relaxed, CERCLAspecific rule of derivative liability that would banish traditional
30
standards and expectations from the law of CERCLA liability."
The Bestfoods rejection of CERCLA-specific rules of corporate parent liability is a major change in the way the statute has been interpreted by the courts.31
B.

Passive Migration

Courts have also contracted the scope of CERCLA liability in
the passive migration arena. 32 In the late 1980's and the early
1990's, the majority of courts that addressed this issue viewed
passive migration of contaminants as a form of disposal under
CERCLA. 33 The Fourth Circuit in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper

28. Id. at 1885 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979);
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (citations omitted). In
a footnote, the Bestfoods Court acknowledged the issue of whether applicable common law principles would be drawn from state or federal
law, but concluded that "the question is not presented in this case, and
we do not address it further." 524 U.S. 51 at 64, n.9.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id.
31. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit anticipated the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bestfoods. In Atchison, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that CERCLA liability of a corporate successor is determined by traditional state law rules on successor liability, not by an expansive federal
common law under CERCLA. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
noting that CERCLA "lacks any clear directive that federal courts develop standards for successor liability." Id. at 1300.
32. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir.
1997). According to the court, passive migration exists when "hazardous chemicals have spread underground." Id. at 354.
33. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
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& Sons Co.34 held a former owner of property liable as an owner
at the time of disposal because hazardous substances had leaked
from underground storage tanks during its ownership. The former owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had
not "actively dealt with hazardous substances at the site" and so
was not an owner or operator at the time of the disposal. 35 The
District Court agreed and dismissed the claim. 36 The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that to read "disposal" to require "active
participation would frustrate [CERCLA's] policy of encouraging
'voluntary private action to remedy environmental hazards.' "37
More recently, courts have moved away from such a broad
reading of "disposal."38 Under current decisions, passive migration of contamination does not give rise to CERCLA liability unless a party consciously acted to dispose of the waste in a manner
39
that promoted its migration through the soil or water.
For example, in ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology,
Inc. ("ABB"), 40 the Second Circuit held that former owners and
operators of a contaminated site were not liable under CERCLA
for the passive migration of chemicals that were already in the
ground at the site. The Second Circuit was persuaded by the
Third Circuit's 1996 decision in United States v. CDMG Realty Co.
("CDMG"), 4' which found that CERCLA's definition of "disposal"

837, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992); Stanley Works v.
Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 664 (E.D. Cal. 1990); CPC Int'l,
Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 789 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
34. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506, U.S. 940 (1992).
35. Id. at 841.
36. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 22 ENVTL. L. REP.
20079, 20088 (D. Md. 1991).
37. Id. at 845 (quoting In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 248
(9th Cir. 1991)).
38. See, e.g., ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc. ("ABB"), 120
F.3d 351, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96
F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996); Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell
Int'l ("Kalamazoo"), 3 F. Supp. 2d 799, 812 (W.D. Mich 1998); Carson
Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1188 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
39. See Kalamazoo, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
40. 120 E3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997).
41. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
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was not so broad as to hold a prior owner or operator liable for
42
the passive migration of contaminants from a landfill.
The Second Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit in CDMG
that rejecting liability for passive migration of contaminants is
consistent with CERCLA's goal "to force polluters to pay the cost
associated with their pollution. '43 That goal is not served if "a
person [who] merely controlled a site on which hazardous chemicals have spread without that person's fault" is held liable as a
polluter.44
C.

The Third-Party Defense

In the 1980's and the early 1990's, the majority of' courts rejected attempts made by various PRPs to invoke any defense to.
Superfund liability, including those premised on the CERCLA
third-party defense. 45 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp. ("Shore Realty"), 46 the Second Circuit rejected a third party defense to
Superfund liability in a case involving the leakage of chemicals
during the defendant's ownership of the site. The court concluded that the release was not caused "solely" by the acts or
omissions of a third-party, and the defendant failed to take pre47
cautions against the foreseeable acts of others.
Yet recently, courts have been more receptive to the third-party
defense. In New York v. Lashins Arcade Co. ("Lashins"), 48 the Second Circuit affirmed a district court's decision that a shopping
center owner was not liable under CERCLA for contamination

42. See id. at 714. The ABB court invoked the plain language of
the statute as indicative of Congressional intent. The Second Circuit
pointed out that the term "leaching" is expressly used in the definition
of "release" but is omitted from the definition of "disposal." The court
reasoned that this distinction shows that Congress was aware of passive
migration through leaching or otherwise, but opted to draft the statute
not to include liability for passive acts. ABB, 120 F.3d at 358.
43. ABB, 120 F.3d at 358 (quoting CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at
717).
44. Id. at 358-59. See Mark A. Chertok & Michael S. Bogin, Passive
Disposal: New Protection Now Available, 218 N.YLJ. S2 (1997).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
46. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. See id. at 1048-49.
48. 91 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996).
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from a dry cleaner that leased space years before the site owner
had acquired the property. The Second Circuit held that the
shopping center owner was shielded from liability by the third49
party defense.
In Lashins, the State of New York argued that the shopping
center owner was not protected by the third-party defense because it had failed to adequately investigate the site prior to acquisition or to exercise "due care" regarding the contamination
caused by others.5 0 The State argued that in order to avail itself
of the defense, the owner would have to take affirmative steps to
remediate the pre-existing contamination. 51 The Second Circuit
rejected New York's arguments:
It is surely the policy of CERCLA to impose liability upon parties responsible for pollution rather than the general taxpaying
public, but this policy does not mandate precluding a 'due
care' defense by imposing a rule that is tantamount to absolute
52
liability for ownership of a site containing hazardous waste.
The Second Circuit's acceptance of a third-party defense in
Lashins, eleven years after rejecting the same defense in Shore Realty, is consistent with a judicial trend curtailing rather than expanding CERCLA's reach.
IV.

THE GROWING BURDEN ON COST SHIFTING

At the same time that the courts are refusing to expand CERCLA liability, courts are also placing impediments on redistributing CERCLA liability through contribution. This latter trend
appears in decisions analyzing whether under CERCLA a PRP
can pursue a Section 107 cost recovery action against other PRPs
or whether a PRP is limited to a contribution claim under Section 113 of CERCLA.
The distinction between Sections 107 and 113 raises several issues that affect the rights and liabilities of PRPs. The significance
of making this distinction is most obvious where contribution is
barred either because defendant-PRPs have received contribution

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 361-62 (citations omitted).
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protection as a result of settling with the government 3 or because the three-year statute of limitations for contribution claims
4
has expired.
Even though Section 107 of CERCLA clearly authorizes private
parties to bring actions to recover response costs,55 a question
nonetheless arises when such a private party pursues a Section
107 action and is itself liable under that Section. May a PRP
maintain a Section 107 "cost recovery" action or must a PRP proceed with a "contribution" action under Section 113? While
there is still a split of authority in the lower courts, "[e]very
court of appeals that has examined this issue has come to the
same conclusion: a Section 107 action brought for recovery of
costs may be brought only by innocent parties that have undertaken clean-ups," and a non-innocent PRP may only bring a Sec56
tion 113 action for contribution.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have addressed this issue and have uniformly held that PRPs are limited to Section 113
contribution actions.5 7 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, while not

53. CERCLA Section 113(f) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2) (1994), confers "contribution protection" upon a PRP who enters into a settlement with the government.
54. CERCLA Section 113 (g) creates a three-year statute of limitations period for most Section 113 contribution actions, and a 6-year
statute of limitations for Section 107 cost recovery actions. 42 U.S.C. §
9 6 13 (g)(2),(3) (1994). See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. ("United Techs."), 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1183 (1995). But see Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 124
F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1045 (1998) (6year statute of limitations period under Section 113 (g)(2) applies to a
contribution claim by a PRP that incurred response costs in any way except pursuant to a Section 106 order or a Section 107 government civil
action, because in such cases the PRP contribution action is itself the
"initial action" under CERCLA).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (1994). See also Key Tronic Corp.
v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 812 n.1 (1994); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 931 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914
(1993).
56. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp. ("New Castle"),
11 F.3d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original).
57. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp. ("Pinal
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directly addressing the issue, have taken the same position. 8
These courts have reasoned that the very definition of contribution indicates that it is the only appropriate remedy for PRPs.
Where a claim is "by and between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has
been compelled to make," it is a claim for contribution and not
cost recovery.5 9 Some courts have found that the 1986 enactment
of Section 113 indicates that Congress intended contribution to
be the exclusive remedy for PRPs 60 and that to allow PRPs to recover cleanup costs under Section 107 would render Section 113
meaningless. 61 Others have insisted that the availability of Section
107 actions should be limited to governmental or "innocent"
PRPs for public policy reasons 62 and that PRP-initiated Section
107 actions would be "both procedurally unwieldy and substantively unfair. "63

Creek"), 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997); New Castle, 11 E3d 1116 (3d Cir.
1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489
(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co. ("Colorado &
E. R.R. Co."), 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. ("United Techs."), 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner
Corp. ("Akzo Coatings"), 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
58. See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 E3d 930, 936 (8th
Cir. 1995) (once a party is found liable under § 9607, the focus shifts
to contribution to determine its equitable share); Amoco Oil Co. v.
Borden, Inc., 889 E2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989) ("When one liable party
sues another to recover its equitable share of the response costs, the
action is one for contribution . . ").
59. See Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1536 (noting that a claim

for reapportionment among PRPs is "the quintessential claim for contribution"); United Techs., 33 F.3d at 99-101; Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at
764; See also In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. 738, 748 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
("contribution" should be given its plain meaning), aff'd, 115 F.3d 111
(3d Cir. 1997); Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132
(D.R.I. 1992); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A&Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp.
1079 (D.NJ.1992), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994).
60. See, e.g., Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 E Supp.
1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
61. See Colorado & E. RR.Co., 50 F.3d at 1536.
62. See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 100.
63. SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1364
(D.NJ. 1996) (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., No. 924491,
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The unsettled nature of the relationship between Sections 107
and 113 creates impediments for the PRP seeking to shift CERCIA response costs to other PRPs. While those impediments flow
indirectly from the divergence in judicial decisions and resulting
uncertainty, two courts have placed direct impediments on contribution by fashioning a threshold burden of proof that a PRP
must meet in order to shift a portion of cleanup costs to others.
In Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc. ("Acushnet f'),64 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the wastes that a
particular defendant had disposed of, together with the wastes of
many others, did not cause the incurrence of any response costs.
Analyzing CERCLA's statutory structure in the light of traditional
common law principles of strict liability, the court held that the
plaintiff in a CERCLA case has the burden of.proving that a par65
ticular defendant's wastes caused some response costs.

In a subsequent decision, Acushnet 11,66 the court granted judg-

1993 WL 668325, at *6-7(D.N.J. 1993) ("In a case involving multiple
PRPs, [allowing a PRP Section 107 action] could result in a chain reaction of multiple, and unnecessary lawsuits," and would provide an "unjustified windfall for the party who filed the first lawsuit")). See also
Stearns & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp.
790, 801 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating that it is "fundamentally unfair" to impose joint and several liability "simply because the first PRP won the
race to the courthouse door").
While agreeing that a private PRP may not bring a direct Section
107 action, several courts have explained that Sections 107 and 113
should be read to work together - the first section establishing the
claim for contribution and the second creating the mechanism for apportioning that liability among PRPs. See, e.g., Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at
1302; New Castle, 11 F.3d at 1122 ("section 113 does not in itself create
any new liabilities; rather, it confirms the right of a [PRP] under section 107 to obtain contribution from other [PRPs]"); United Techs., 33
F.3d at 102 (same); Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 987
F. Supp. 182, 207-09 (E.D.N.Y 1997) (explaining that Section 107 provides a PRP with a right of contribution which is mapped out by Section 113).
64. 937 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1996).
65. See id. at 993-1001.
66. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc., 948 F. Supp. 128, 134-38 (D.
Mass. 1996).
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ment as a matter of law to three other parties based upon the insufficiency of the evidence of a relationship between the wastes
that they disposed at the site and the incurrence of response
costs. In doing so, the court established a "threshold-ofsignificance standard": "plaintiffs must proffer sufficient evidence
as to a particular defendant to satisfy a minimum standard of significance of that defendant's responsibility as a source of one or
more hazardous substances deposited at the site. ' 6 More recently, the court in Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International68 applied the threshold-of-significance test articulated in
Acushnet II and held that evidence of a defendant's release must
be of sufficient significance in causing the incurrence of response costs to justify holding defendant liable for those costs.
There, the district court drew support for the application of such
a test from the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Cordova
Chemical Co. of Michigan:
[T]he widest net possible ought not be cast in order to snare
those who are either innocently or tangentially tied to the facility at issue ....
[W]e adhere to the tenet that the liability attaches only to those parties who are culpable in the sense that
they, by some realistic measure, helped create the harmful
69
conditions.
If followed by other courts, this amorphous threshold burden
would establish a significant impediment to shifting costs under
CERCLA. Such a rule shifts the focus of contribution actions
from determining shared responsibility to conducting costbenefit analyses of litigation. Under this additional burden, the
PRP contemplating cost shifting would face a powerful disincentive against pursuing any parties beyond those most obviously
responsible.

67. Id. at 136. See also Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc., 972 F Supp.
41, 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (requiring the plaintiff in a contribution action
to satisfy a threshold-of-significance standard).
68. 3 F. Supp. 2d 799 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
69. Id. at 806 (quoting United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113
F.3d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1997)).

482

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
V.

[Vol. IX

CONCLUSION

As the federal courts develop rules governing shifting CERCLA
costs among PRPs, they should consider the effects of those rules
on the statutory goals of fostering settlements and using private
rather than public monies to remediate contaminated sites. Restricting the ability to spread costs to others impedes rather than
fosters those important CERCLA goals.

